July 2026
Dispatching Ride Requests Does Not Constitute Employment—The Supreme Court Narrows Ride-Hailing Platforms’ Joint and Several Liability for Damages
(I) Brief Facts
B was a professional taxi driver who joined the fleet operated by Defendant C Platform Company, a Taxicab Transportation Service that provided platform-based matching and dispatch services. B also registered his vehicle under the name of D Taxicab Transportation Cooperative, a Taxicab Transportation Business, through an affiliation arrangement, and obtained the vehicle registration and commercial passenger vehicle license plate in D Cooperative’s name. While transporting a passenger, B ran a red light and struck a pedestrian, causing the pedestrian to sustain fatal injuries. B’s criminal liability for negligent homicide was established by a final criminal judgment.
The victim’s family filed an action alleging that both C and D were B’s employers and should therefore be jointly and severally liable with B for damages under the doctrine of employer liability. The liability of D and B had already been finally determined by the judgment in the prior instance. Accordingly, the only remaining issue in this case was whether C should also bear joint and several liability as B’s employer under Article 188 of the Civil Code for B’s conduct. [1]
C argued in this case that it was merely a Taxicab Transportation Service that provided drivers with platform-based matching and dispatch services. It also collected fares paid by passengers by credit card and, after deducting dispatch fees and platform service fees, transferred the remaining amounts to the drivers. There was no employment relationship between C and B involving the selection or supervision of B. Moreover, the exterior of the vehicle at issue bore no markings identifying C, making it objectively difficult to conclude that B was performing duties for C.
(II) The Court of the Prior Instance (Civil Judgment No. 1, Jian-Geng-Yi, 2023, Taiwan High Court, Taichung Branch Court)
Citing the Supreme Court’s consistent position, the court stated that the term “employee” under Article 188 of the Civil Code is determined based on the existence of a de facto employment relationship:“The term ‘employee’ is not limited to an employee under an employment contract, but is determined based on the existence of a de facto employment relationship. Any person who, objectively, is engaged by another to provide services and is subject to that person’s supervision is an employee, regardless of whether a written contract has been entered into between the employer and the employee.” (See the holdings of Supreme Court Judgments No. 1224, Tai-Shang, 1953; No. 1663, Tai-Shang, 1968; No. 305, Tai-Shang, 1980; and No. 2722, Tai-Shang, 1984.)
On this basis, the court of the prior instance determined that C was an employer from both the perspectives of outward appearance and substance. First, as to outward appearance, B was transporting a passenger pursuant to C’s dispatch at the time of the accident. Although C’s name was not displayed on the exterior of the vehicle at issue, an advertisement for C was posted inside the vehicle, and the passenger had hailed the taxi and identified the vehicle through C’s platform. Therefore, the absence of C’s name on the exterior of the vehicle did not affect the performance of the passenger transportation service dispatched by C. The court further stated that the requirement for taxis to display a company name was merely a safety-management requirement under the Regulations Governing Road Traffic Safety and was not a constituent element for determining whether an employment relationship existed. Otherwise, an unfair result would arise whereby a person who failed to display the required marking in violation of the regulations would instead be exempt from employer liability.
In addition, from a substantive perspective, the court considered the manner in which C withheld B’s salary income tax and settled and paid fare remuneration on a monthly basis, as well as the provisions in the driver agreement requiring drivers to use payment services as instructed by the fleet, obtain insurance, undergo verification of their professional qualifications, participate in training courses, comply with system-use rules, and be subject to sanctions, including termination of the agreement, in the event of a breach. The court therefore determined that C possessed substantive authority to select and supervise B, and that there existed personal, organizational, and economic subordination between the parties. Furthermore, the Regulations Governing the Approval of Taxicab Transportation Services impose statutory duties on dispatch service operators to manage, train, and supervise their affiliated drivers, further demonstrating the existence of a de facto employment relationship between a dispatch service operator and its affiliated drivers. C also failed to prove that it had exercised reasonable care in the selection and supervision of B. Accordingly, C remained jointly and severally liable with B as an employer under Paragraph 1 of Article 188 of the Civil Code.
C Company appealed the foregoing judgment.
(III) The Supreme Court (Supreme Court Civil Judgment No. 17, Tai-Jian-Shang, 2024)
The Supreme Court stated that an employee under Paragraph 1 of Article 188 of the Civil Code must, objectively, provide services for the employer and be subject to the employer’s supervision. In principle, the remuneration for such services and the manner, time, and scope of the work should be determined by the employer. Where such substantive characteristics are absent, and the conduct of the actor also does not present an appearance sufficient for others to recognize that the actor is providing services for a specific person, it is difficult to impose employer liability on that person.
The Court further cited the definitions under Subparagraph 15 of Article 2 and Subparagraph 4 of Paragraph 1 of Article 34 of the Highway Act to distinguish between a “Taxicab Transportation Business” and a “Taxicab Transportation Service.” The former refers to a business that transports passengers for hire by sedan within an approved area, namely what is commonly referred to as a taxi company, transportation cooperative, or individual vehicle owner. The latter refers to a business that receives remuneration for providing passenger transportation services by taxi, namely a ride-hailing platform operator.
A taxi operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business charges passengers fares based on a taximeter. In addition to accepting dispatches, the driver may independently cruise for passengers and queue for passengers, and may independently determine the manner, time, and scope of work. This differs from a taxi not operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business, which may only transport passengers by reservation pursuant to dispatches from a Taxicab Transportation Service. The relevant regulations further expressly provide that the Taxicab Transportation Business is responsible for managing its vehicles and drivers. By contrast, a Taxicab Transportation Service merely provides dispatch services and only provides passengers with estimated fare information, without authority to determine the fares charged by drivers or their work arrangements. Therefore, even where a taxi operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business engages a Taxicab Transportation Service to handle dispatching, it is generally difficult to conclude that the driver provides services for, or is subject to the supervision of, the Taxicab Transportation Service. Moreover, under the first part of Subparagraph 3 of Paragraph 1 of Article 42 of the Regulations Governing Road Traffic Safety, the name required to be displayed on the body of a taxi is that of the Taxicab Transportation Business to which it belongs. A diversified taxi or a taxi operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business that engages a Taxicab Transportation Service to handle dispatching is not legally required to display the name of the Taxicab Transportation Service. Accordingly, an employment relationship between the driver and the Taxicab Transportation Service may not be inferred on this basis.
In this case, B was a member of D Taxicab Transportation Cooperative, a Taxicab Transportation Business, and the vehicle at issue was a taxi operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business and managed by D Taxicab Transportation Cooperative. The judgment holding D liable as B’s employer in this respect had already become final. C, however, operated a Taxicab Transportation Service rather than a Taxicab Transportation Business. The body and roof light of the vehicle at issue displayed only the name of D Cooperative and bore no marking identifying C. This showed that ordinary road users could not ascertain from the vehicle’s outward appearance any connection between the vehicle and C. On this basis, the Supreme Court held that the court of the prior instance had failed to distinguish between a Taxicab Transportation Business and a Taxicab Transportation Service and had directly concluded that C should also bear employer liability. The reasoning of the judgment was therefore open to question. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the portions of the original judgment ordering C to make payment and allocating litigation costs, and remanded the case to the original court for further proceedings.
(IV) Analysis
The first sentence of Paragraph 1 of Article 188 of the Civil Code provides that where an employee, in the performance of his duties, wrongfully causes injury to the rights of another, the employer and the actor shall be jointly liable for damages. In this regard, courts have generally held that whether a person constitutes an employee under Article 188 of the Civil Code is determined based on the existence of a de facto employment relationship, regardless of whether a written contract has been entered into between the employer and the employee. Moreover, the term “employee” is not limited to an employee under an employment contract; any person who, objectively, is engaged by another to provide services and is subject to that person’s supervision is an employee. (See Supreme Court Civil Judgments No. 1599, Tai-Shang, 1956; No. 1663, Tai-Shang, 1968; and No. 111, Tai-Shang, 1993.) In the past, the majority of courts also held that, in principle, taxi fleet operators should bear joint and several liability as employers under Paragraph 1 of Article 188 of the Civil Code for torts committed by their affiliated taxi drivers. (See, for example, Supreme Court Civil Judgments No. 779, Tai-Shang, 2003, and No. 346, Tai-Shang, 2014.)
Although the Supreme Court in this case did not overturn the foregoing majority view and continued to use the existence of a de facto employment relationship as the criterion for determining employee status, it additionally incorporated the business classifications of “Taxicab Transportation Business” and “Taxicab Transportation Service” under the Highway Act. On the grounds that drivers of taxis operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business may independently solicit passengers and arrange their work shifts, and therefore possess autonomy over their work, and that Article 91 of the Regulations for Automobile Transportation Operators expressly designates the Taxicab Transportation Business as the entity responsible for managing its affiliated vehicles and drivers, the Court conversely inferred that, under ordinary circumstances, a driver of a taxi operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business that commissions dispatch services cannot be regarded as providing services for, or being subject to the supervision of, the Taxicab Transportation Service. This inference raises the following concerns.
First, the allocation of responsibilities under regulatory laws is intended to designate the entity responsible for administrative management, which is distinct from determining the existence of a de facto employment relationship under Article 188 of the Civil Code. In addition, court practice has consistently recognized that an employee may simultaneously have multiple employers, whose respective liabilities constitute an imperfect joint and several relationship. Accordingly, the fact that regulations separately designate a management entity does not necessarily preclude the concurrent existence of an employment relationship between the platform and the driver.
Second, this allocation of responsibilities is in fact a product of the era of radio-dispatched taxi companies. Under the platform economy, dispatching, payment-flow control, qualification verification, training, and even disciplinary termination have all shifted into the hands of platforms. In affiliation arrangements, a Taxicab Transportation Business often serves merely as the nominal holder of the license and rarely exercises substantive control over a driver’s daily operations. This case is a pertinent example: none of the evidence of substantive control identified by the court of the prior instance involved conduct by the regulatory “management entity.” The Supreme Court’s reliance on an outdated regulatory framework to determine the allocation of civil liability is therefore also open to question.
In particular, the platform operator in this case was the party that actually organized the transportation service, controlled the payment flow, and collected a dispatch fee and platform service fee from each passenger trip. It was also in the best position to distribute accident risks through insurance mechanisms. By contrast, drivers who cause accidents often lack sufficient financial resources, while the cooperative merely serves as the nominal management entity. If the presumption established by this judgment allows the platform to avoid liability, it would effectively create a misallocation under which the platform receives the benefits while the victim bears the risks. This is inconsistent with the normative functions of Article 188, namely protecting victims and distributing the risk of loss.
This judgment remanded the case for further proceedings rather than making a final determination. Moreover, its presumption of non-liability was expressly limited to “taxis operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business that commission dispatch services.” By contrast, because fares for diversified taxis are determined by agreement between the Taxicab Transportation Service and consumers, and drivers may only transport passengers pursuant to dispatches, the application of the substantive characteristics under such a model may lead to the opposite conclusion. As forms of labor under the platform economy become increasingly diverse, the determination of employer liability must ultimately return to substantive realities. The outcome of the proceedings on remand and whether this position will remain stable warrant continued attention.
[1] This case was, in fact, reviewed by the Supreme Court twice. Following the Supreme Court’s first remand, the case was adjudicated on remand in Civil Judgment No. 1, Jian-Geng-Yi, 2023, discussed below. C appealed that judgment, and the Supreme Court remanded the case for a second time in Civil Judgment No. 17, Tai-Jian-Shang, 2024, also discussed below. This procedural background is noted at the outset.
B was a professional taxi driver who joined the fleet operated by Defendant C Platform Company, a Taxicab Transportation Service that provided platform-based matching and dispatch services. B also registered his vehicle under the name of D Taxicab Transportation Cooperative, a Taxicab Transportation Business, through an affiliation arrangement, and obtained the vehicle registration and commercial passenger vehicle license plate in D Cooperative’s name. While transporting a passenger, B ran a red light and struck a pedestrian, causing the pedestrian to sustain fatal injuries. B’s criminal liability for negligent homicide was established by a final criminal judgment.
The victim’s family filed an action alleging that both C and D were B’s employers and should therefore be jointly and severally liable with B for damages under the doctrine of employer liability. The liability of D and B had already been finally determined by the judgment in the prior instance. Accordingly, the only remaining issue in this case was whether C should also bear joint and several liability as B’s employer under Article 188 of the Civil Code for B’s conduct. [1]
C argued in this case that it was merely a Taxicab Transportation Service that provided drivers with platform-based matching and dispatch services. It also collected fares paid by passengers by credit card and, after deducting dispatch fees and platform service fees, transferred the remaining amounts to the drivers. There was no employment relationship between C and B involving the selection or supervision of B. Moreover, the exterior of the vehicle at issue bore no markings identifying C, making it objectively difficult to conclude that B was performing duties for C.
(II) The Court of the Prior Instance (Civil Judgment No. 1, Jian-Geng-Yi, 2023, Taiwan High Court, Taichung Branch Court)
Citing the Supreme Court’s consistent position, the court stated that the term “employee” under Article 188 of the Civil Code is determined based on the existence of a de facto employment relationship:“The term ‘employee’ is not limited to an employee under an employment contract, but is determined based on the existence of a de facto employment relationship. Any person who, objectively, is engaged by another to provide services and is subject to that person’s supervision is an employee, regardless of whether a written contract has been entered into between the employer and the employee.” (See the holdings of Supreme Court Judgments No. 1224, Tai-Shang, 1953; No. 1663, Tai-Shang, 1968; No. 305, Tai-Shang, 1980; and No. 2722, Tai-Shang, 1984.)
On this basis, the court of the prior instance determined that C was an employer from both the perspectives of outward appearance and substance. First, as to outward appearance, B was transporting a passenger pursuant to C’s dispatch at the time of the accident. Although C’s name was not displayed on the exterior of the vehicle at issue, an advertisement for C was posted inside the vehicle, and the passenger had hailed the taxi and identified the vehicle through C’s platform. Therefore, the absence of C’s name on the exterior of the vehicle did not affect the performance of the passenger transportation service dispatched by C. The court further stated that the requirement for taxis to display a company name was merely a safety-management requirement under the Regulations Governing Road Traffic Safety and was not a constituent element for determining whether an employment relationship existed. Otherwise, an unfair result would arise whereby a person who failed to display the required marking in violation of the regulations would instead be exempt from employer liability.
In addition, from a substantive perspective, the court considered the manner in which C withheld B’s salary income tax and settled and paid fare remuneration on a monthly basis, as well as the provisions in the driver agreement requiring drivers to use payment services as instructed by the fleet, obtain insurance, undergo verification of their professional qualifications, participate in training courses, comply with system-use rules, and be subject to sanctions, including termination of the agreement, in the event of a breach. The court therefore determined that C possessed substantive authority to select and supervise B, and that there existed personal, organizational, and economic subordination between the parties. Furthermore, the Regulations Governing the Approval of Taxicab Transportation Services impose statutory duties on dispatch service operators to manage, train, and supervise their affiliated drivers, further demonstrating the existence of a de facto employment relationship between a dispatch service operator and its affiliated drivers. C also failed to prove that it had exercised reasonable care in the selection and supervision of B. Accordingly, C remained jointly and severally liable with B as an employer under Paragraph 1 of Article 188 of the Civil Code.
C Company appealed the foregoing judgment.
(III) The Supreme Court (Supreme Court Civil Judgment No. 17, Tai-Jian-Shang, 2024)
The Supreme Court stated that an employee under Paragraph 1 of Article 188 of the Civil Code must, objectively, provide services for the employer and be subject to the employer’s supervision. In principle, the remuneration for such services and the manner, time, and scope of the work should be determined by the employer. Where such substantive characteristics are absent, and the conduct of the actor also does not present an appearance sufficient for others to recognize that the actor is providing services for a specific person, it is difficult to impose employer liability on that person.
The Court further cited the definitions under Subparagraph 15 of Article 2 and Subparagraph 4 of Paragraph 1 of Article 34 of the Highway Act to distinguish between a “Taxicab Transportation Business” and a “Taxicab Transportation Service.” The former refers to a business that transports passengers for hire by sedan within an approved area, namely what is commonly referred to as a taxi company, transportation cooperative, or individual vehicle owner. The latter refers to a business that receives remuneration for providing passenger transportation services by taxi, namely a ride-hailing platform operator.
A taxi operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business charges passengers fares based on a taximeter. In addition to accepting dispatches, the driver may independently cruise for passengers and queue for passengers, and may independently determine the manner, time, and scope of work. This differs from a taxi not operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business, which may only transport passengers by reservation pursuant to dispatches from a Taxicab Transportation Service. The relevant regulations further expressly provide that the Taxicab Transportation Business is responsible for managing its vehicles and drivers. By contrast, a Taxicab Transportation Service merely provides dispatch services and only provides passengers with estimated fare information, without authority to determine the fares charged by drivers or their work arrangements. Therefore, even where a taxi operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business engages a Taxicab Transportation Service to handle dispatching, it is generally difficult to conclude that the driver provides services for, or is subject to the supervision of, the Taxicab Transportation Service. Moreover, under the first part of Subparagraph 3 of Paragraph 1 of Article 42 of the Regulations Governing Road Traffic Safety, the name required to be displayed on the body of a taxi is that of the Taxicab Transportation Business to which it belongs. A diversified taxi or a taxi operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business that engages a Taxicab Transportation Service to handle dispatching is not legally required to display the name of the Taxicab Transportation Service. Accordingly, an employment relationship between the driver and the Taxicab Transportation Service may not be inferred on this basis.
In this case, B was a member of D Taxicab Transportation Cooperative, a Taxicab Transportation Business, and the vehicle at issue was a taxi operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business and managed by D Taxicab Transportation Cooperative. The judgment holding D liable as B’s employer in this respect had already become final. C, however, operated a Taxicab Transportation Service rather than a Taxicab Transportation Business. The body and roof light of the vehicle at issue displayed only the name of D Cooperative and bore no marking identifying C. This showed that ordinary road users could not ascertain from the vehicle’s outward appearance any connection between the vehicle and C. On this basis, the Supreme Court held that the court of the prior instance had failed to distinguish between a Taxicab Transportation Business and a Taxicab Transportation Service and had directly concluded that C should also bear employer liability. The reasoning of the judgment was therefore open to question. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the portions of the original judgment ordering C to make payment and allocating litigation costs, and remanded the case to the original court for further proceedings.
(IV) Analysis
The first sentence of Paragraph 1 of Article 188 of the Civil Code provides that where an employee, in the performance of his duties, wrongfully causes injury to the rights of another, the employer and the actor shall be jointly liable for damages. In this regard, courts have generally held that whether a person constitutes an employee under Article 188 of the Civil Code is determined based on the existence of a de facto employment relationship, regardless of whether a written contract has been entered into between the employer and the employee. Moreover, the term “employee” is not limited to an employee under an employment contract; any person who, objectively, is engaged by another to provide services and is subject to that person’s supervision is an employee. (See Supreme Court Civil Judgments No. 1599, Tai-Shang, 1956; No. 1663, Tai-Shang, 1968; and No. 111, Tai-Shang, 1993.) In the past, the majority of courts also held that, in principle, taxi fleet operators should bear joint and several liability as employers under Paragraph 1 of Article 188 of the Civil Code for torts committed by their affiliated taxi drivers. (See, for example, Supreme Court Civil Judgments No. 779, Tai-Shang, 2003, and No. 346, Tai-Shang, 2014.)
Although the Supreme Court in this case did not overturn the foregoing majority view and continued to use the existence of a de facto employment relationship as the criterion for determining employee status, it additionally incorporated the business classifications of “Taxicab Transportation Business” and “Taxicab Transportation Service” under the Highway Act. On the grounds that drivers of taxis operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business may independently solicit passengers and arrange their work shifts, and therefore possess autonomy over their work, and that Article 91 of the Regulations for Automobile Transportation Operators expressly designates the Taxicab Transportation Business as the entity responsible for managing its affiliated vehicles and drivers, the Court conversely inferred that, under ordinary circumstances, a driver of a taxi operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business that commissions dispatch services cannot be regarded as providing services for, or being subject to the supervision of, the Taxicab Transportation Service. This inference raises the following concerns.
First, the allocation of responsibilities under regulatory laws is intended to designate the entity responsible for administrative management, which is distinct from determining the existence of a de facto employment relationship under Article 188 of the Civil Code. In addition, court practice has consistently recognized that an employee may simultaneously have multiple employers, whose respective liabilities constitute an imperfect joint and several relationship. Accordingly, the fact that regulations separately designate a management entity does not necessarily preclude the concurrent existence of an employment relationship between the platform and the driver.
Second, this allocation of responsibilities is in fact a product of the era of radio-dispatched taxi companies. Under the platform economy, dispatching, payment-flow control, qualification verification, training, and even disciplinary termination have all shifted into the hands of platforms. In affiliation arrangements, a Taxicab Transportation Business often serves merely as the nominal holder of the license and rarely exercises substantive control over a driver’s daily operations. This case is a pertinent example: none of the evidence of substantive control identified by the court of the prior instance involved conduct by the regulatory “management entity.” The Supreme Court’s reliance on an outdated regulatory framework to determine the allocation of civil liability is therefore also open to question.
In particular, the platform operator in this case was the party that actually organized the transportation service, controlled the payment flow, and collected a dispatch fee and platform service fee from each passenger trip. It was also in the best position to distribute accident risks through insurance mechanisms. By contrast, drivers who cause accidents often lack sufficient financial resources, while the cooperative merely serves as the nominal management entity. If the presumption established by this judgment allows the platform to avoid liability, it would effectively create a misallocation under which the platform receives the benefits while the victim bears the risks. This is inconsistent with the normative functions of Article 188, namely protecting victims and distributing the risk of loss.
This judgment remanded the case for further proceedings rather than making a final determination. Moreover, its presumption of non-liability was expressly limited to “taxis operated by a Taxicab Transportation Business that commission dispatch services.” By contrast, because fares for diversified taxis are determined by agreement between the Taxicab Transportation Service and consumers, and drivers may only transport passengers pursuant to dispatches, the application of the substantive characteristics under such a model may lead to the opposite conclusion. As forms of labor under the platform economy become increasingly diverse, the determination of employer liability must ultimately return to substantive realities. The outcome of the proceedings on remand and whether this position will remain stable warrant continued attention.
[1] This case was, in fact, reviewed by the Supreme Court twice. Following the Supreme Court’s first remand, the case was adjudicated on remand in Civil Judgment No. 1, Jian-Geng-Yi, 2023, discussed below. C appealed that judgment, and the Supreme Court remanded the case for a second time in Civil Judgment No. 17, Tai-Jian-Shang, 2024, also discussed below. This procedural background is noted at the outset.
