The Code of Criminal Procedure does not limit the types of corroboration. Direct evidence, indirect evidence or indirect facts per se (i.e. circumstantial evidence) may all serve as materials to corroborative evidence (Taiwan)

Oli Wong

The Supreme Court rendered the 108-Tai-Shang-Zi-3668 Decision of November 29, 2019 (hereinafter, the “Decision”), holding that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not limit the types of corroboration. Direct evidence, indirect evidence or indirect facts per se (i.e. circumstantial evidence) may all serve as materials to corroborative evidence.

According to the facts underlying this Decision, X and Y, who communicated their criminal intent to deal in Class 3 Drugs and attempted to generate profits, agreed to have Y engage in the dealings after X had negotiated details with Z.  After Y’s arrival at the trading location in his car, X would then complete the transaction by asking Y to contact Z and deliver Class 3 Drugs to Z, and offsetting X’s previous debt to Z against the drug payment.  Y would subsequently hand over the proceeds of the drug sale to X.  X and Y sold drugs twice in the above-mentioned fashion and were indicted by the prosecutors after they were caught.

According to the facts underlying this Decision, the facts determined by the court do not have to be direct evidence, and direct and indirect evidence obtained as a result of all kinds of investigation may certainly be relied on by the trial court pursuant to law for its determination based on appropriate inference and reasoning.  The Code of Criminal Procedure of Taiwan does not limit the types of corroborative evidence. Direct or indirect evidence or indirect facts per se (i.e. circumstantial evidence) may all serve as materials to corroborative evidence.

According to the Decision, criminal facts show that X sold drugs to Z twice when Y was the one on both occasions to visit the trading location to deliver the drugs and offset X’s previous unpaid debt against the drug payment, as evidenced by Accomplice Y’s confession and sworn testimony during the investigation and in the first instance trial.  In addition, the matter of X’s communication concerning the drug trade is consistent with Z’s testimony.  In addition, pictures extracted from the video footage of a surveillance camera at the crossroads are sufficient to support that the original trial court’s fact-finding of the process in which Class 3 Drugs were sold twice in this case was a reasonable inference.  In addition, all kinds of evidence in the court files, not just Y’s single statement, were generally relied on.  The conclusion that X in fact committed the crime in this case is legally appropriate.   Therefore, since Appellant X’s allegation that the original decision lacked corroborative evidence, violated the rules of evidence or failed to apply laws or applied laws inappropriately or had insufficient grounds was not a ground for legally appealing to the third instance, the Decision was rendered to dismiss the appeal.