Frank Sun
The Supreme Court rendered the 108-Tai-Shang-1737 Decision of November 7, 2019 (hereinafter, the “Decision”), holding that an administrative agency may attach incidental provisions such as conditions or encumbrances to its administrative disposition. However, since the effect of incidental provisions vary, if the court fails to explore the criteria for the establishment or lapse of the effect of the incidental provisions attached to an administrative disposition rendered by an administrative agency in detail, the court decision would violate laws and regulations.
According the facts underlying this Decision, Land A was the property of Individual A. Individual B authorized Individual C to negotiate with the Appellant’s legal agent, Individual D, to apply to the urban development department of a particular city to change the land-use delineation of Land A and 24 other parcels of land and to promise that after the land-use delineation of the lands was changed successfully, Individual A was willing to share the contribution of the exaction land and accommodate the reconstruction on adjacent lands pursuant to government requirements. Individual C filed the application to include Land A in the amendment to the land-use delineation. . After B was deceased, his inheritor registered the transfer of the land to the Appellee. The city government subsequently changed the 25 parcels of land including Land A from “park land” in the original urban plan into a “new residential zone.” However, 30% of the building lots in the zone were required to be exacted as road lands and be transferred entirely to the city government for neighborhood infrastructure. Therefore, Individual C coordinated with the owners of the road lands (hereinafter, the “Donors at Issue”) and donated the lands to the city government. Although Land A was not delineated as an extraction land for roads, still its land-use delineation was changed from “park land” to “residential zone.” Since the Appellee enjoyed objective benefits from land value appreciation, obtained the qualification for acquiring the adjacent state-owned fractional lands and completed the acquisition, Individual E, who sustained, as one of the Donors at Issue, a damage for assuming a higher share of the extraction land, requested that 19.29% of Land A should be returned to Individual E. Individual E retained the Appellant to request the Appellee to register the transfer of 4.8225% of Land A back to the Appellant.
According to the Decision, an administrative agency may, within its discretion, attach incidental provisions such as conditions or encumbrances to an administrative disposition in accordance with Article 99 of the Civil Code and Article 93 and Article 123, Subparagraph 3 of the Administrative Procedure Law. For an administrative disposition attached with incidental provisions, the establishment or lapse of its effect depends on uncertain facts which may occur in the future. If a lawful administrative disposition attached with encumbrances is rendered to grant benefits, the beneficiary is obligated to engage in, refrain from or tolerate certain acts. If such encumbrances are not performed, the original disposition agency may ex officio abolish the entirety or part of the administrative disposition.
It was further pointed out in this Decision that for the requirement in the city government’s plan concerning the “required extraction for road lands from the construction lots in such zone” that all extraction lands should be completely transferred to the city before the incidental provisions on construction may be applied, it is necessary to clarify whether this is a precondition for the establishment or lapse of effect or an encumbrance that imposes an obligation on the beneficiary. If this is an encumbrance that imposes an obligation on the beneficiary, it would appear that the beneficiary is obligated to donate the land when the administrative disposition goes into effect. This calls into question if such obligation should be shared by all owners of the 25 parcels of lands at issue, who benefit from the amendment to the land-use delineation of Land A. In case the Appellee also assumed an obligation, if the obligation is exempt due to the donation of lands designated by a certain city government by other donors, this would raise the question of whether the Appellee should be deemed to have received benefits for non-legal reasons. Such issues should have been further explored. The original trial court, which had failed to explore such issues in detail, inappropriately rendered a decision unfavorable to the Appellant.