A decision’s violation of legal precedents under Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Speedy Trial Law does not include violation of relevant legal precedents under Articles 377 through 379 and Article 393, Subparagraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the gist of the second instance decision (Taiwan)

2017.11.22
Jenny Chen

The Supreme Court rendered the 106-Tai-Shang-3473 Criminal Decision of November 22, 2017, holding that a decision’s violation of legal precedents under Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Speedy Trial Law does not include violation of relevant legal precedents under Articles 377 through 379 and Article 393, Subparagraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the gist of the second instance decision.

According to the facts underlying this Decision, the Defendants were jointly charged for the offense of a civil servant’s enrichment over matters he/she handles or supervises under Article 6, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 4 of the Anti-corruption Law.  The previous trial court held, as a result of its examination, that the offense of the Defendants could not be substantiated.  Therefore, the first instance decision which had acquitted the Defendants was upheld, and the second instance appeal of the prosecution was rejected.   The prosecution appealed on the ground that the Supreme Court’s 31-Shang-1312 and 44-Tai-Shang-702 Decision were violated in this case for failure to conduct the required investigation.

Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Speedy Trial Law provides: “Except for the circumstances provided for in Article 8 of the same law, if the court of second instance upholds the not-guilty judgement rendered by the first instance court, the reasons for appeal shall be limited to the circumstances where the laws or regulations applied to the decision contradicts the Constitution or violates judicial interpretations of the Judicial Yuan or legal precedents.”  Paragraph 2 provides: “Articles 377 through 379 and Article 393, Subparagraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall not apply to the trial of the cases in the preceding paragraph.”  It was pointed out in this Decision that a decision’s violation of legal precedents does not include the violation of relevant legal precedents under Articles 377 through 379 and Article 393, Subparagraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the gist of the second instance decision in order to meet the objective of strict legal review.  Therefore, the prosecution should appeal the above case to the third instance court on the ground that the matters set forth in the subparagraphs of Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Speedy Trial Law were violated by the original decision, which is a legal requirement.   If the reasons of appeal failed to specifically criticize the circumstance of any legal violation in the original decision, the appeal will violate legal procedures and should be rejected.

It was further pointed out in this Decision that the legal precedents cited by the prosecution in this case were all relating to Article 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and did not fall within the applicable scope of a “decision’s violation of legal precedents” as mentioned above.  In addition, the reasons as asserted only merely pertain to “failure to investigate evidence on the trial date pursuant to this Law” under Article 379, Subparagraph 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure” and the circumstances of “failure to specify reasons in the decision” and “contradictory reasons” under Subparagraph 14 of the same article.  Therefore, it was held that since the prosecution’s appeal did not meet the required legal procedures, the appeal was rejected.